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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j) (1953, as
amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether the trial court was correct in granting Defendant's attorney's fees
pursuant to Utah Code § 78-27-56, where there are no written findings of bad faith in the
bringing of the claim, but where it is reasonable to assume that the court actually made
such findings?

STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Findings of Fact. The appellate court reviews a trial court's findings of fact under
a clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). "For a
reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings made by the
trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving disputes in the evidence
in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination. Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d
923, 929 (Utah Ct App. 1998). "This standard is highly deferential to the trial court
because it is before that court that the witnesses and parties appear and the evidence is
adduced. The judge of that court is therefore considered to be in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceeding as a whole,
something an appellate court cannot hope to gamer from a cold record." Pena, 869 P.2d
at 936.

Questions of Law. The appellate court "accords no deference to the trial court and
reviews the trial court's decisions for correctness." J.H. v. West Valley City, 840 P.2d 115
(Utah 1992). "Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which we review for
correctness." Taylor v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 923, 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).

STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2005)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2005)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 34
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24a9
(These provisions have been reproduced in the attached Addendum "A").

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of a civil matter from the Sixth District Court in Sanpete County,

Manti Division. Plaintiffs - Appellants, Kathy Hopkins and Mark Hopkins (together, the
"Hopkins") filed a complaint against Defendant - Appellee, Mr. Hales, to enforce a NonCompetition Agreement and a Non-Disclosure Agreement (hereinafter, the
"Agreements"), after they terminated his employment with them.
Based on the evidence accepted by the district court, the court held that the
Agreements were unenforceable and were the products of Hopkins' intentional and
repeated bad faith conduct against Hales during his employment with them. Before the
2

final judgment was entered by the district court, Mr. Hales filed a motion seeking costs
and attorney's fees.
II.

Course of the Proceedings
The Hopkins filed their complaint and motion for temporary restraining order on

December 28, 1999. R. 1, 358. Mr. Hales' counsel, Mr. Graham, entered an appearance
on January 7, 2000 and filed an answer and counterclaim on February 17, 2000. R. 19,
29, 358. A scheduling conference was conducted on April 12, 2000, at which the court
scheduled the Hopkins' temporary restraining order hearing for May 3, 2000. R. 65, 67,
68,358,359.
After a full day evidentiary hearing on May 3, 2000, the court recessed. The court
thereafter scheduled a second full day to continue the evidentiary hearing for May 17,
2000. R. 86, 359. During the May 17, 2000 hearing, the Agreements and other evidence
submitted by the parties were received. On the scant evidentiary record provided by
Plaintiffs, the following evidence was also received: (1) From Kathy Hopkins—that the
Agreements were signed with promises of benefits; (2) From Bill Hales—promises were
given regarding employment with Elkridge, benefits, training, income, and future
business possibilities; (3) From Tami Baugh (Defendant's witness—the conditions of Mr.
Hales employment and benefits offered but never give. R. 300-301. The parties then
stipulated to reconvene on May 24, 2000 at 10:00 a.m. R. 93.
The evidentiary hearing was concluded on May 24, 2000 and the court scheduled
oral arguments for June 21, 2000 at 2:00 p.m. R. 93, 95, 359. On June 21, 2000, the
court heard oral arguments. R. 98, 359. The arguments commenced at 2:06 p.m. and the
3

matter was taken under advisement at 5:07 p.m. R. 98, 359. At the closing of the
arguments, the court ordered each party to prepare their respective proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law and to submit them to the court. R. 99, 359. The proposed
findings were submitted to the court on July 3, 2000. R. 100, 106, 359. The court
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and associated Order on July 27,
2000, finding that Hopkins had acted in bad faith, that the Agreements had been
negotiated by Hopkins in bad faith, that the Agreements were unenforceable and that
Plaintiffs pay Defendant's attorney's fees. R. 132, 134, 359.
On October 16,2000, Defendant's counsel filed an Amended Affidavit of
Attorney's fees. On November 13, 2000, Plaintiffs filed an objection to the costs and
attorney's fees, as well as a Motion to Vacate the Court's Order. After considerable
debate over the July 2000 order, findings, and decree, the court granted Plaintiffs' Motion
to Vacate the Order on March 21, 2001. A new order was entered on December 19,
2002. R. 256, 359. The court re-accepted and re-entered with no change the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law that had been filed by the Defendant. Plaintiffs continued
to object to defendant's attorney's fees affidavit. Defendant continued to amend the
Attorney's Fees affidavit according to the direction of the court. On March 15, 2004,
pursuant to its decision to grant Defendant's Motion and award attorney's fees to Mr.
Hales, the court entered its Order for Plaintiffs to pay Defendant's attorney's fees in the
amount of $6,5085.00. R. 462

4

III.

Disposition in Trial Court

On July 27, 2000, after briefing and argument by the parties, the court issued its
Order denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction and entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As part of the
Order, the court awarded attorney's fees to the Defendant. That Order was vacated by
the court on March 21, 2001, and a new order was entered on December 19, 2002,
reserving the issue of attorney's fees. On March 15, 2004, the court granted the
Defendant attorney's fees under the December 19, 2002 Order, stating that "[t]he
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case provide a sufficient basis for an
award of attorney fees pursuant to section 78-24-561, Utah Code." The court required a
new motion to be filed because of deficiencies. R. 326. On July 26, 2006, the Honorable
David L. Mower entered a judgment for attorney's fees in the amount of $6,085.00 to the
Defendant. R. 462.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Hopkins are individuals residing in Gunnison City, Sanpete County, Utah, and
are the sole proprietors of Elkridge Financial. R. 256-57. They maintained their
principal place of business in Gunnison. R. 257. The Hopkins began doing business as
Elkridge on or about February, 1997. R. 257. The Hopkins became acquainted with Bill

1

Mr. Hales agrees with the Hopkins that the court's reference to U.C.A. § 78-24-56 of
the Utah Code was a clerical error, and that they court meant to cite U.C.A. § 78-27-56.
5

Hales on or about March, 1999, when Mr. Hales sought to obtain a loan through the
services of Elkridge. R. 257.
Shortly thereafter, on or about March, 1999, Hales and Hopkins entered into a
business relationship whereby Hales was employed by Elkridge as an independent
contractor and consultant. R. 257. Prior to his employment relationship, Hales had no
experience in the loan or mortgage broker industry. The Hopkins agreed to pay Hales
$2,000.00 per month. R. 257. Elkridge did not provide a written employment agreement
to Hales at the time of his initial employment. On May 13, 1999, the Hopkins and Mr.
Hales executed two agreements: a Non-Compete Agreement, and a Non-Disclosure
Agreement. The limitations contained in the Agreements consisted of a time restraint of
five (5) years and a geographical restriction of a 100 mile radius from Elkridge's
principal place of business in Gunnison, Utah. R. 258. The only training Hales received
was how to fill out loan applications. R. 257-58. All other information that Hales
learned concerning the mortgage lending business he learned on his own and through his
own efforts. R. 258, 300-301.
In or about April, 1999, the Hopkins determined to open an office in Richfield,
Utah. R. 259. Mr. Hales was required to man the Richfield office alone beginning in or
about August, 1999. One month later, Hopkins told Hales he would need to find new
work because Hopkins could not pay him. R. 300-301. Prior to lending, Mr. Hales had
acted as a police officer. R. 258. He looked for employment in law enforcement with no
success. R. 259-260. Consequently, he began looking for employment with other
mortgage brokers. R. 260. Meanwhile, as Hales continued soliciting loans and acquiring
6

information and applications for potential loan applicants for Elkridge, Mrs. Hopkins
assured him that his employment with Elkridge was secure. R. 260.

In November, 1999, Mr. Hales was asked to relinquish his keys to the Richfield
office and the files which he was working on for Elkridge. R. 260. Hales promptly did
so. R. 260. Pursuant to his earlier employment search efforts, Hales immediately
contacted another mortgage broker to pursue employment. Such pursuit was fruitful and
Hales began to solicit loans for the new mortgage broker company towards the end of
December, 1999, about three (3) weeks after his termination. R. 260. Having learned of
Hales' activities in December, 1999, the Hopkins filed this action against him for breach
of the Agreements. R.l.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The district court judge was correct in awarding Defendant's attorneys fees
because the Plaintiffs claim was without merit and was brought in bad faith, thus
satisfying the requirements of both the statute and the case law regarding the granting of
attorneys fees. Furthermore, the court was not required to make written findings of bad
faith litigation if the evidence in the record makes it reasonable to assume that it made
such findings.
Plaintiffs argument that Utah Code Section 78-27-56.5 is controlling is irrelevant
to this appeal because the issue was never raised in the court below and is, therefore,
waived. Even if it had been preserved, the plaintiffs would not prevail in their argument

7

because sections 78-27-56 and 78-27-56.5 are not mutually exclusive as the Plaintiffs
posit.
ARUGMENTS
POINT ONE
PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT MET THEIR OBLIGATION TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE IN CHALLENGING THE COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure states, in relevant part,
that "a party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." This Court ruled on this issue when it stated:
We repeatedly have set forth the heavy burden appellants must bear when
challenging factual findings. To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate. [Attorneys] must extricate
[themselves] from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In
order to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty..., the challenger must present,
in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant resists.
Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage & Warehouse, 872 P.2d 1051, 1052-53 (Utah 1994)
(internal citations omitted).
Appellate Counsel has utterly failed to fulfill this duty. The record to which
appellate counsel refers contains only the thinnest skin of the underlying evidence upon
which the district court relied in reaching its factual findings and conclusions that
Plaintiffs conduct with Defendant was bad faith conduct. Appellate counsel completely
fails to provide any of the district court's evidentiary meat, bones, or tissue regarding,
among other things: Plaintiffs' bad faith negotiations producing the Agreements;
Plaintiffs' promises of consideration made to Hales in exchange for his consent to enter
into the Agreements; Plaintiffs' intentional refusal to fulfill those promises; Plaintiffs'
8

malicious conduct in terminating Hales employment; and Plaintiffs fraudulent conduct in
inducing Hales to enter the Agreements, the terms of which were legally unenforceable.
All such evidence has been preserved by the district court on audio tapes, which
are available for purchase from the district court upon request. See Addendum "B"
(Request for Duplication of Recorded Hearing). Because appellate counsel has failed to
satisfy this fundamental requirement, Defendant urges the Court to disregard, sua sponte,
Plaintiffs9 brief.
POINT TWO
COURT PROPERLY APPLIED SECTION 78-27-56 BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS9
ACTION LACKED MERIT AND WAS BROUGHT IN BAD FAITH
Plaintiffs' main argument is whether the court properly awarded attorney fees
pursuant to Section 78-27-56 of the Utah Code. This section gives the court power to
grant attorney's fees to a prevailing party where an action or defense was without merit
and was brought or asserted in bad faith. That section states in relevant part:
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing
party if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith....
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Cady v. Johnson ,
671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983), is the seminal case on this issue. There, the Court
explicitly enumerated the various requirements of what the prevailing party must
demonstrate in order to be awarded attorney fees. The prevailing part must demonstrate
that the claim is (1) without merit, and (2) not brought or asserted in good faith. Cady,
671P.2datl51.

9

A claim is without merit if it is "of little weight or importance having no basis in
law or fact." Id. The Plaintiffs' claim had no basis in law or in fact because the
agreements on which their claim was based were negotiated in bad faith, were without
consideration, and were unenforceable. This point is undisputable regardless of
Plaintiffs' continued attempts to argue to the contrary. There is ample evidence of this in
the district court's Findings of Fact. The court also included these issues as Conclusions
of Law. For example, the Plaintiffs induced the Defendant into signing the Agreements
by continually making promises to pay consideration, while never intending to actually
follow through. Specifically, Plaintiffs represented that Defendant would be quickly
promoted, receive increased compensation and employment benefits, including health
insurance, and equity ownership Plaintiff Elkridge. R. 259. These promises were never
fulfilled and the agreed upon consideration was never paid. R. 260-61. The district court
concluded that the "Hopkins engaged in bad faith negotiations by promising
consideration in exchange for Hales' signature and thereafter failing to provide that
consideration ," and that the Agreements "were not supported by consideration and are
therefore unenforceable." R. 263-64. Therefore, the first prong of the statute is clearly
fulfilled.
Plaintiffs did not bring or assert their claims in good faith, thus satisfying the
statute's second prong. Good faith is defined as having "(1) an honest belief in the
propriety of the activities in question; (2) no intent to take unconscionable advantage of
others; and (3) no intent to, or knowledge of the fact that the activities in question will

10

hinder, delay, or defraud others." Id. To establish bad faith, a party must prove that one
or more of these factors is lacking.

Plaintiffs' assertion that they acted in good faith to enforce the agreements must
fall on deaf ears. Logic does not permit Plaintiffs to argue that a party which negotiated
agreements in bad faith can pursue the enforcement of such bad faith agreements "in
good faith." Yet this is what Plaintiffs attempt to do. Thus, this argument not only flies
in the face of the evidence accepted by the district court and the district court's Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but it flies in the face of reason as well. Moreover, if
acting in good faith is acting without malice as Plaintiffs claim, bad faith logically
implies acting with malice. In fact, Black's Law Dictionary defines "bad faith" as
"involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another," and
"not simply bad judgment or negligence, but rather.. .the conscious doing of a wrong
because of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity." Black's Law Dictionary. By simple
and valid logic, Plaintiffs impale themselves on the horns of their own argument.
Specifically, the district court found that Plaintiffs acted in bad faith vis-a-vis Defendant.
Therefore, by definition, Plaintiffs acted with malice, deceit, and fraud vis-a-vis
Defendant. They sought to take unconscionable advantage of Defendant, and they
certainly acted with the intent to defraud him. In doing so, Plaintiffs failed to meet more
than one, if not all three, of the good faith requirements put forth in Cady.
Plaintiffs also attempt to argue that while the court below did make written
findings of bad faith in the underlying agreements and in the Plaintiffs who forged them,
it did not make any written findings of bad faith in the Plaintiffs' bringing of the claim,
11

and therefore the court erred in granting attorney's fees under section 78-27-56.
However, despite what seems like clear language to the contrary2 in § 78-27-56, the Utah
Supreme Court is adamant that written findings of meritlessness and bad faith are not
required. See, e.g., In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, f 51, 86 P.3d 712 (Utah 2004);
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315-16 & n.l (Utah 1998). Regarding the award of
attorney's fees pursuant to § 78-27-56, the Sonnenreich court stated:
Generally, this court will uphold the district court even if it failed to make findings
on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the court actually
made such findings. In so stating, we explicitly reject[] prior dicta implying that
section 78-27-56 requires the district court to make specific finds with regard to
each element of the statute in order to determine whether the award of attorney
fees was based on a meritless claim brought in bad faith or simply because the
recovering party prevailed.
In re Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3, ^ 51, 86 P.3d 712 (Utah 2004)(internal quotations
omitted)(emphasis added). There are cases to the contrary. See Chipman v. Miller, 934
P.2d 1158, 1161 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also, Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). But these cases are all the progeny of Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa
& Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1068 (Utah 1991), which the Supreme Court has said relied on
dicta to so hold. See, Valcarce, 961 P.2d at 315 n.l.
Sonnenreich applies directly to this case. While the district court did not make any
explicit or written findings that the Hopkins pursued this claim in bad faith, the district court
2

A strong textual argument can actually be made that no written findings are required by
§ 78-27-56. The statute requires that the court "determine" meritlessness and bad faith.
When the court concludes that bad faith existed but in its discretion awards no fees or
limited fees, it must "find" two elements. See § 78-27-56(2); Canyon Country Store v.
Bracy, 781 P.2d 414, 422 n.7 (Utah 1989). Assuming the legislature knows the meaning
of the words it chooses when it crafts statutes, there must be some purpose to that
distinction.
12

stated in its Order dated March 15, 2004, that "[t]he Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in
this case provide a sufficient basis for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 78-24-56 ,
Utah Code." Based on the explicit written findings of the district court, together with the district
court judge's statement that "this case provide[s] a sufficient basis for an award of attorney fees,"
it is "reasonable to assume that the court made"findingsof bad faith in the pursuit of the claim.
POINT THREE
SECTION 78-27-56.5 ISSUE WAS NOT RAISED BELOW, AND IS THEREFORE
WAIVED
The remaining arguments made by the Plaintiffs are nothing more than an
awkward attempt to complicate the main issue discussed above by dangling these red
herrings in front of the Court. These issues are irrelevant. Even so, Defendant chooses to
address them because the Plaintiffs have raised them.
Plaintiffs claim that the district court judge applied the incorrect section of the
Utah Code when he awarded Defendant's attorney's fees. Plaintiffs assert that the court
should have applied § 78-27-56.5 instead of § 78-27-56 because the claim was based on a
contract. Plaintiffs are prevented from raising this issue on appeal because it was never
raised in the court below. Neither the Defendant nor the Plaintiffs ever based any claims
on § 78-27-56.5, and Defendant raised only § 78-27-56 in his affirmative defenses, which
was the statute the court ultimately relied on in granting Defendant's motion for
attorney's fees.
The general rule of appeals, as discussed by the Utah Supreme Court, is that
"[ajbsent plain error or extraordinary circumstances, [the appeals court does] not address
3

Defendant assumes the reference to section 78-24-56 is a clerical error and that the trial
court meant to cite 78-27-56.
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issues raised for the first time on appeal." Bd. ofTrs. v. Keystone Conversions, LLC, 103
P.3d 686 (Utah 2005). Elsewhere, the Court has explained,
In order to preserve an issue for appeal [,] the issue must be presented to the trial
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.
This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted error and allows for
correction at that time in the course of the proceeding. For a trial court to be
afforded an opportunity to correct the error "(1) the issue must be raised in a
timely fashion[,] (2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and (3) the challenging
party must introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. Issues that
are not raised at trial are usually deemed waived.
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 99 P.3d 801 (Utah 2004) (citations omitted)(emphasis
added). Because the Plaintiffs failed to raise this issue below, this Court should deem the
issue waived.
Even if the Plaintiffs had raised this issue below, they would not have been able to
prevail on it here on appeal. Plaintiffs assertion that § 78-27-56.5 of the Utah Code
should have been applied by the district court instead of § 78-27-56, because their claim
was based on a contract, implies that the two sections are mutually exclusive. Plaintiffs
provide no legal authority for such a conclusion because there is none. Moreover,
Plaintiffs have disregarded § 78-27-56's language, which does not include an exemption
for contract cases. Plaintiffs' conclusion is simply incorrect.
Section 78-27-56.5 provides for reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees if the
civil action is based on a contract. It addresses the unequal bargaining positions usually
associated with contract formation and provides relief to the lesser of the two parties by
allowing both parties access to attorneys fees should they prevail, even if the contract

14

explicitly states that only one party is entitled to them. Section 78-27-56.5 is one basis
for recovering those fees and costs, and not an exclusive basis for doing so.
As discussed above, § 78-27-56 provides an entirely separate and distinct basis by
which a party may recover attorney's fees and costs; that of demonstrating that the claim
at issue was without merit and was brought in bad faith. If this Court were to follow the
Plaintiffs' reasoning of mutually exclusivity, it would be precluded from ever awarding
attorney's fees in contract cases brought in bad faith.

POINT FOUR
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES WAS TIMELY.
The Hopkins' argument that Mr. Hales' Motion for Attorney's Fees was untimely
is wrong and misses significant legal and factual points. Defendants Amended Affidavit
for Costs and Attorney's Fees was timely submitted as required under Rule 54(d). This
the Plaintiffs do not dispute. Rule 54(d) states in relevant part:
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or
subsequent to the service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of law,
but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and
filed on the date the judgment is entered.
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). Defendants filed his Affidavit of September 2000, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum "C'\ with the district court after
the court determined to deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and to
dismiss its Complaint, or after service and filing of the findings of fact and conclusions of
law but before the entry of judgment in December 2002. Therefore, notwithstanding the
Hopkins' argument to the contrary, Mr. Hales has complied with Rule 54(d)(2).

15

The district court's determination to vacate its original Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, as well as its Order of July 27, 2000, did not invalidate the proper
and timely filing of Defendant's Affidavit for Costs and Attorney's Fees. Indeed,
Plaintiffs do not even dispute this point.
Additionally, the district court noted in the June 21, 2001 hearing that the vacation
of its initial Order and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law had nothing to do with
the merits of the case. The court also made clear to Plaintiffs and Defendant at the
hearing that the court intended to reenter Defendant's Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law. The district court recognized this issue's lack of merit and disposed of it.
Thus, the Hopkins' arguments that Mr. Hales did not act timely under Rule 54(d)
are legally and factually inaccurate and wrong. Therefore, this Court, relying on
Defendant's Amended Affidavit of October 2000, should affirm the district court's order
granting Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees.

POINT FIVE
ARGUMENTS PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED AND ANSWERED
In Points Three, Four and Five of Plaintiffs' brief, the Plaintiffs have cut and
pasted the arguments they made in their Memorandum in Opposition to Motion For
Attorney Fees dated October 7, 2003. These issues were addressed, clarified, and
corrected by Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees Pursuant to Court Order Dated March 10, 2004,
and dated April 7, 2004 (attached hereto as Addendum "D"). Defendant's April 7, 2004
Memorandum and Amended Affidavit for Attorney's Fees was the sole basis for the
16

district court's granting Defendant's motion for attorney's fees. All the information
included in points three, four, and five is out-of-date and irrelevant to this proceeding.

POINT SIX
DEFENDANT ASKS THE COURT FOR ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED ON
APPEAL
As a final matter, Defendant asks this Court that it not only award costs pursuant
to Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, but that the Court also award
attorney's fees incurred by Defendant on appeal. The Utah Supreme Court stated in
Salmon v. Davis County, 916 P.2d 890, 895 (Utah 1996), that "this court has interpreted
attorney fee statutes broadly so as to award attorney fees on appeal where a statute
initially authorizes them.'1 The Court later added that "when a party who received
attorney fees below prevails on appeal, the party is also entitled to fees reasonably
incurred on appeal." Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 319 (Utah 1998). As such,
Defendant asks this Court to award both costs and attorney fees that Defendant has
incurred on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Based on the fore going arguments, Defendant asks this Court to affirm the district
court's granting of Defendant's motion for attorney's fees. Defendant additionally asks
the court to award the costs and attorney's fees Defendant has incurred on this appeal.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7A

day of July, 2007.

STANFORTTA. GRAHAM
Attorney for Defendant - Appellee
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Stanford A. Graham, hereby certify that on this Z* day of July, 2007,1 mailed
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE, postage prepaid,
to:

D.Bruce Oliver #5120
D. BRUCE OLIVER, L.L.C.
180 South 300 West, Suite 210
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorney for Plaintiffs - Appellants
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UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 GENERAL SESSION. ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 34 (4/19/2007); 2007 UT APP 119 (4/19/2007) AND APRIL
15, 2007 (FEDERAL CASES). ***
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART III. PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 27. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (2007)
§ 78-27-56. Attorney's fees ~ Award where action or defense in bad faith - Exceptions
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party if the court determines that
the action or defense to the action was without merit and not brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection
(2).
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under Subsection (1), but only if
the court:
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit of impecuniosity in the action before the court; or
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of Subsection (1).
HISTORY: L. 1981, ch. 13, § 1; 1988, ch. 92, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Appeal.
~ Frivolous appeal.
— Prevailing party.
Award.
— Distinguishing between fees.
Bad faith.
Discretion of court.
Essential elements.
Fees properly awarded.
Fees properly denied.
Findings.
Good faith by insurer.
Hearing.
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Copyright 2007 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. a member of the LexisNexis Group.
All rights reserved.
*** STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2007 GENERAL SESSION. ***
*** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 2007 UT 34 (4/19/2007); 2007 UT APP 119 (4/19/2007) AND APRIL
15, 2007 (FEDERAL CASES). ***
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART III. PROCEDURE
CHAPTER 27. MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Go to the Utah Code Archive Directory
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (2007)
§ 78-27-56.5. Attorney's fees - Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory
note, written contract, or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the promissory note,
written contract, or other writing allow at least one party to recover attorney's fees.
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-27-56.5, enacted by L. 1986, ch. 79, § 1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Contractual indemnity provision.
Discretion of court.
Cited.
CONTRACTUAL INDEMNITY PROVISION.
This section did not entitle plaintiff to attorney's fees on the basis of a contractual indemnity clause in favor of
defendant. BJ. Barnes & Sons Trucking, Inc. v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., — F. Supp. 2d—, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6720 (D. Utah Jan. 30, 2007).
DISCRETION OF COURT.
In an action involving claims for breach of warranty, misrepresentation, and mutual mistake, where the only claim
stemmed from the contract, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine not to attempt to allocate the
attorney's fees and denial of attorney fees was appropriate. Schafir v. Harrigan, 879 P.2d 1384 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
CITED in Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 781 P.2d 1292 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992); Chase v. Scott, 2001 UT App 404, 18 P3d 1001.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5

A.L.R. -Attorney's liability under state law for opposing party's counsel fees, 56 A.L.RAth 486.
Excessiveness or adequacy of attorneys' fees in matters involving real estate, 10 A.L.R. 5th 448.
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
PART VII. JUDGMENT
URCP Rule 54 (2007)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule
Rule 54. Judgments; costs.
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. A
judgment need not contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. Judgments
shall state whether they are entered upon trial, stipulation, motion or the court's initiative; and, unless otherwise directed
by the court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference.
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When more than one claim for relief is
presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties
are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express
direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of
decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject
to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties.
(c) Demand for judgment.
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant
the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in
his pleadings. It may be given for or against one or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between or among themselves.
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different in kind from, or exceed in amount, that
specifically prayed for in the demand for judgment.
(d) Costs.
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however,
where an appeal or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah,
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its officers and agencies shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law.
(2) How assessed. The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of judgment serve upon the
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary
disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's
knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding.
A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a
motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court.
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as
served and filed on the date judgment is entered.
(e) Interest and costs to be included in the judgment. The clerk must include in any judgment signed by him any
interest on the verdict or decision from the time it was rendered, and the costs, if the same have been taxed or
ascertained. The clerk must, within two days after the costs have been taxed or ascertained, in any case where not
included in the judgment, insert the amount thereof in a blank left in the judgment for that purpose, and make a similar
notation thereof in the register of actions and in the judgment docket.
HISTORY: Amended effective January 1, 1985; November 1, 2003
NOTES:
Amendment Notes.— The 2003 amendment added the last sentence to Subdivision (a) and made stylistic changes.
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (d)(3) and (d)(4), relating to the award of costs by the appellate court and costs in
original proceedings before the Supreme Court, were repealed with the adoption of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, effective January 1, 1985. See, now, Rule 34(d), Utah R.App.P.
This rule is similar to Rule 54, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References.-- Continuances, discretion to require payment of costs, U.R.C.P. 40(b).
State, payment of costs awarded against, § 78-27-13.
Stay of judgment upon multiple claims, U.R.C.P. 62(h).
Witness fees, taxing as costs, § 78-46-30.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Absence of express determination.
Amendment of pleadings.
Appeal as of right.
Certification not determinative.
Costs.
- In general.
- Challenge of award.
- Depositions.
~ Discretionary.
- Expenses of preparation for action.
- Extension of time for filing.
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Utah R. App. P. Rule 24 (2007)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule
Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate headings and in the order
indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or order is sought to be
reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules, statutes and other
authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of appellate review with
supporting authority; and.
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or.
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation is determinative of
the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent
part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the
brief under paragraph (11) of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of
proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review
shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record
in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of
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the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under which the
argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities,
statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding. A party seeking to recover attorney's fees incurred on appeal shall state the request
explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such an award.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this paragraph. The addendum
shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the brief but not
reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals opinion; in all cases any court opinion of
central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and.
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of the appeal, such as the
challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral
decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule,
except that the appellee need not include:
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the statement of the appellant; or.
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant. The appellee may refer
to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the appellee has
cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the
cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in the opposing brief. The content of
the reply brief shall conform to the requirements of paragraphs (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court.
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their briefs and oral arguments to keep to a
minimum references to parties by such designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the actual names of parties, or descriptive terms
such as "the employee," "the injured person," "the taxpayer," etc.
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated
pursuant to Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or transcripts shall identify the sequential
number of the cover page of each volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by the transcriber. References to exhibits
shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was identified, offered, and received or
rejected.
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(f) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs
shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases
involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of this rule sets forth the length of briefs.
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party first filing a notice of appeal shall be
deemed the appellant, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise orders. Each party shall be entitled to file
two briefs. No brief shall exceed 50 pages, and no party's briefs shall in combination exceed 75 pages.
(1) The appellant shall file a Brief of Appellant, which shall present the issues raised in the appeal.
(2) The appellee shall then file one brief, entitled Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, which shall respond to the
issues raised in the Brief of Appellant and present the issues raised in the cross-appeal.
(3) The appellant shall then file one brief, entitled Reply Brief of Appellant and Brief of Cross-Appellee, which
shall reply to the Brief of Appellee and respond to the Brief of Cross-Appellant.
(4) The appellee may then file a Reply Brief of Cross-Appellant, which shall reply to the Brief of Cross-Appellee.
(h) Permission for over length brief. While such motions are disfavored, the court for good cause shown may upon
motion permit a party to file a brief that exceeds the limitations of this rule. The motion shall state with specificity the
issues to be briefed, the number of additional pages requested, and the good cause for granting the motion. A motion
filed at least seven days before the date the brief is due or seeking five or fewer additional pages need not be
accompanied by a copy of the brief. A motion filed less than seven days before the date the brief is due and seeking
more than 5 additional pages shall be accompanied by a copy of the draft brief for in camera inspection. If the motion is
granted, any responding party is entitled to an equal number of additional pages without further order of the court.
Whether the motion is granted or denied, the draft brief will be destroyed by the court.
(i) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases involving more than one appellant or
appellee, including cases consolidated for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another. Parties may similarly join in reply
briefs.
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant authorities come to the attention of a party
after that party's brief has been filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise the clerk
of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme
Court. An original letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a reference either to the
page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the
reasons for the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing and shall be similarly limited.
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, presented with accuracy, logically
arranged with proper headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which are
not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court may assess
attorney fees against the offending lawyer.
HISTORY: Amended effective October 1, 1992; July 1, 1994; April 1, 1995; April 1, 1998; November 1, 1999; April
1, 2003; November 1, 2004; April 1, 2006; November 1, 2006
NOTES:
Advisory Committee Note. ~ Rule 24 (a)(9) now reflects what Utah appellate courts have long held. See In re
Beesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994); Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). "To
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STATE RULES
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
TITLE V. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Utah R. App. P. Rule 34 (2007)
Review Court Orders which may amend this Rule
Rule 34. Award of costs.
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the
appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs shall
be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the
appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be
allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or officer thereof, an
award of costs for or against the state shall be at the discretion of the court unless specifically required or prohibited by
law.
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record, bonds and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed as
costs in favor of the prevailing party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or typewritten brief or memoranda and
attachments not to exceed $ 3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record,
including costs of the reporter's transcript unless otherwise ordered by the court; premiums paid for supersedeas or cost
bonds to preserve rights pending appeal; and the fees for filing and docketing the appeal.
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur. A party claiming costs shall, within 15 days after the remittitur is filed with
the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the adverse party and file with the clerk of the trial court an itemized and verified
bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days of service of the bill of costs, serve and file a notice of objection,
together with a motion to have the costs taxed by the trial court. If there is no objection to the cost bill within the
allotted time, the clerk of the trial court shall tax the costs as filed and enter judgment for the party entitled thereto,
which judgment shall be entered in the judgment docket with the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments
of record. If the cost bill of the prevailing party is timely opposed, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall
tax the costs and enter a final determination and judgment which shall thereupon be entered in the judgment docket with
the same force and effect as in the case of other judgments of record. The determination of the clerk shall be reviewable
by the trial court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of the judgment.
(e) Costs in other proceedings and agency appeals. In all other matters before the court, including appeals from an
agency, costs may be allowed as in cases on appeal from a trial court. Within 15 days after the expiration of the time in
which a petition for rehearing may be filed or within 15 days after an order denying such a petition, the party to whom
costs have been awarded may file with the clerk of the appellate court and serve upon the adverse party an itemized and
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verified bill of costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days after the service of the bill of costs file a notice of objection
and a motion to have the costs taxed by the clerk. If no objection to the cost bill is filed within the allotted time, the
clerk shall thereupon tax the costs and enter judgment against the adverse party. If the adverse party timely objects to
the cost bill, the clerk, upon reasonable notice and hearing, shall determine and settle the costs, tax the same, and a
judgment shall be entered thereon against the adverse party. The determination by the clerk shall be reviewable by the
court upon the request of either party made within 5 days of the entry of judgment; unless otherwise ordered, oral
argument shall not be permitted. A judgment under this section may be filed with the clerk of any district court in the
state, who shall docket a certified copy of the same in the manner and with the same force and effect as judgments of
the district court.
HISTORY: Amended effective November 1, 1999
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Costs awarded.
Cited.
Costs awarded.
Although the court denied the award of attorney fees to husband under Rule 33(a) because the wife's appeal had a
reasonable factual and legal basis, costs were awarded to husband under Rule 34. Cooke v. Cooke 2001 Utah App.
LEXIS 28 2001 UT App 110, 22 P.3d 1249 (Utah Ct App. 2001).
Cited in Barber v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. 2006 Utah LEXIS
96.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. - 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 909 et seq
C.J.S. - 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 995
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Stanford A. Graham (6392)
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, P.C.
2120 North Valley View Drive
Layton, Utah 84040
Telephone: (801) 497-0094
Facsimile: (801) 497-0982

f

®A

Attorney for Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
CITY OF EPHRAIM, STATE OF UTAH

MARK HOPKINS and KATHY HOPKINS
dba ELK RIDGE FINANCIAL

AFFIDAVIT OF COSTS AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES

Plaintiff,
vs.
BILL HALES
Civil No. 990600458
Judge: David L. Mower

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE
Comes Now, Stanford A. Graham, after being sworn upon his oath deposes and says:
1.

I am the attorney for the Defendant in the above captioned action.

2.

A reasonable attorney's fee to be awarded in this matter is $ 17,185.50 calculated as

follows:
114.57 hours to meet with client, preparation of Answer and Counterclaim and
Amended Counterclaim, work on potential claims to pursue against Elkridge, review Non Compete
and Non Disclosure Agreement, multiple telephone conferences with client and opposing counsel,
multiple meetings with client and witnesses, multiple correspondence to client and opposing counsel,

legal research, prepare Opposition to Temporary Restraining Order, review case law and legal
research, prepare client's affidavit, prepare Memorandum in Opposition to Temporary Restraining
Order, prepare and attend hearing on the Temporary Restraining Order, prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, correspondence to the Court, prepare Order, and prepare Affidavit of Attorney's
Fees and C o * . *A+
M

3.
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Plaintiffs counsel's hourly rate is in the sum of $ 150.00 per hour which was necessarily

incurred in prosecuting this action.
4.

Plaintiffs counsel is familiar with hourly rates charged by other attorneys in this area

for similar matters and further states that 114.57 hours is a reasonable amount of time to spend in this
action.
5.

Costs incurred in prosecuting this action are as follows:
$

DATED this

90.00 filing fees for Counterclaim.

$7»—
>*

day of

(i u A ^ y r

2000.

STANFORD A. GRAHAM
Attorney for Plaintiff

SWORN AND SUBSCRIBED to before me this 3$* day of QuuugVAJL&f
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Notary Public
KYLIECAHQQfl
3889 South Swallow
WestVa,,e C), utah84123
y yMy Commission Expires
Match 3, 2001
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on ^ y day of CAxjJtyjJxt, 2000,1 mailed via first class mail, a true and
exact copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVITOF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS, to the Defendants
at their last known address as follows:
Douglas L. Neeley, Esq.
427 East 400 South
Manti,Utah 84642

rfUjlu C&LMIA

3

ADDENDUM D

Stanford A. Graham (6392)
of STANFORD A. GRAHAM, P.C.
2120 North Valley View Drive
Layton,Utah 84040
Telephone: (801) 497-0094
Attorney for Defendant, Bill Hales

IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF SANPETE COUNTY
CITY OF EPHRAIM, STATE OF UTAH
MARK HOPKINS and KATHY HOPKINS
dba ELK RIDGE FINANCIAL
Plaintiffs,
vs.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO
COURT ORDER DATED
MARCH 10,2004

BILL HALES,
Defendant.
Civil No. 990600458
Judge David L. Mower
Pursuant to the Court's Order of March 10, 2004 wherein the Court found and stated that
"[t]he Findings and Conclusions of Law in the case provided sufficient basis for an award of
Attorney's Fees pursuant to section 78-24-56, Utah Code..."; and further stated that if Defendant
or his counsel "intend to seek a specific amount of money, a new Motion would be required",
Defendant submits this Motion for Attorney's fees in the amount of $24,180.00 which were
reasonably incurred in Defendant's defense of Plaintiffs' Complaint and Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order, both of which were based on a non-compete agreement and non-disclosure
agreement which Complaint and Temporary Restraining Order where brought without merit and

without good faith.
This Motion is based on the more specified information which this Court requested in its
Order and more particularly described in the Affidavit of Defendant's counsel, Stanford A. Graham,
for the purpose of clarifying to this Court the amount of reasonable Attorney's Fees which the Court
should award Defendant pursuant to his necessitated defense. This Motion is filed and served
concurrently with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion for Attorney's
Fees pursuant to the Court's Order Dated March 10,2004.
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DATED this 1 day of April, 2004.
STANFORD A. GRAHAM, P.C

STANFORD A. GRAHAM
Attorney for Defendant
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the - p ^ a a y of April, 2004,1 mailed first class, postage prepaid
a true and exact copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES to the following:
David Bruce Oliver
180 South 300 West #210
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

